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A New Metric for Measuring the Security of
an Environment: The Secrecy Pressure
Lorenzo Mucchi, Senior Member, IEEE, Luca Ronga, Senior Member, IEEE, Xiangyun Zhou, Member, IEEE,
Kaibin Huang, Senior Member, IEEE, Yifan Chen, Senior Member, IEEE, and Rui Wang
Abstract— Information-theoretical approaches can ensure1
security, regardless of the computational power of the attackers.2
Requirements for the application of this theory are: 1) assuring3
an advantage over the eavesdropper quality of reception and4
2) knowing where the eavesdropper is. The traditional metrics5
are the secrecy capacity or outage, which are both related to6
the quality of the legitimate link against the eavesdropper link.7
Our goal is to define a new metric, which is the characteristic8
of the security of the surface/environment where the legitimate9
link is immersed, regardless of the position of the eavesdropping10
node. The contribution of this paper is twofold: 1) a general11
framework for the derivation of the secrecy capacity of a surface,12
which considers all the parameters that influence the secrecy13
capacity and 2) the definition of a new metric to measure the14
secrecy of a surface: the secrecy pressure. The metric can be15
also visualized as a secrecy map, analogously to weather forecast.16
Different application scenarios are shown: from “forbidden zone”17
to Gaussian mobility model for the eavesdropper. Moreover, the18
secrecy outage probability of a surface is derived. This additional19
metric can measure, which is the secrecy rate supportable by the20
specific environment.21
Index Terms— Physical-layer security, secrecy pressure, secrecy22
capacity, secrecy outage, security of wireless communications.23
I. INTRODUCTION24
IN WIRELESS networks, transmission between legitimate25 nodes can easily be intercepted by an eavesdropper due26
to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. This makes27
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wireless transmissions highly vulnerable to eavesdropping 28
attacks. Existing communications systems typically adopt 29
cryptographic techniques in order to achieve confidential trans- 30
mission, to prevent an eavesdropper from interpreting data 31
transmission between legitimate users. 32
It is known that encrypted transmission is not perfectly 33
secure, since the cipher text can still be decrypted by an eaves- 34
dropper through a brute-force attack, an exhaustive search of 35
the encryption key into the cipher text. 36
To this end, physical-layer security is an emerging alter- 37
native paradigm to protect wireless communications against 38
eavesdropping attacks, including brute-force attacks. In fact, 39
the security of cryptographic techniques is implicitly set into 40
the practical assumption that the attacker does not have enough 41
computational power to hack the cipher text in a reasonable 42
amount of time. Thus, security of encryption algorithm cannot 43
be measured exactly. On the contrary, information-theoretical 44
physical-layer security does not need to make any assumption 45
of the computational power of the attacker, and, in addition, 46
the security of a communication link can be exactly measured. 47
Physical-layer security work was pioneered by Shannon 48
and evolved by Wyner in [1], where a discrete memoryless 49
wiretap channel was examined for secure communications 50
in the presence of an eavesdropper. Perfectly secure data 51
transmission can be achieved if the channel capacity of the 52
legitimate link is higher than the eavesdropper link (from 53
source to eavesdropper). In [2], Wyners results were extended 54
to Gaussian wiretap channel: a new metric, the secrecy capac- 55
ity, was proposed. The secrecy capacity was derived as the 56
difference between the channel capacity of the legitimate 57
link and of the eavesdropper link. If the secrecy capacity 58
is above zero, the legitimate source can adapt the data rate 59
in order to let the destination decode the information, while 60
the data overheard by the eavesdropper is too few and noisy 61
to be decoded. If the secrecy capacity falls below zero, the 62
transmission from source to destination becomes completely 63
insecure, and the eavesdropper can succeed in interpreting the 64
data. In order to improve the security against eavesdropping 65
attacks, one solution is to reduce the probability of occurrence 66
of an intercept event through enlarging the secrecy capacity. 67
As a consequence, there are extensive works aimed at 68
increasing the secrecy capacity of wireless communications by 69
exploiting multiple antennas [3] and/or cooperative relays [4]. 70
A. Related Works 71
There are some examples in literature of papers attempting 72
to create a physical region to face the randomness of the 73
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eavesdropper location and/or the amplitude fluctuation due74
to fading. All these attempts are basically based on the use75
of multiple antennas and beamforming [5], [10]–[12]. These76
works aim at building a region as small as possible where the77
message can be considered secure. The region is built by using78
beamforming and/or antenna coding between the legitimate79
transmitter and receiver, or with the help of friendly surround-80
ing nodes (artificial noise injection, jamming). Actually, the81
definition of the physical region can differ from paper to paper,82
but mainly beamforming or jamming are used in the works83
based on information-theoretical parameters, in the form of84
antenna arrays [10] or distributed antennas [5].85
In [6] secrecy rate maximization and power consump-86
tion minimization for a multiple-inputmultiple-output (MIMO)87
secrecy channel is investigated. A multiantenna cooperative88
jammer is employed to improve secret communication in89
the presence of a multiantenna eavesdropper. In [7] and [8]90
a phase-shifting array is used to produce security in a given91
direction (directional modulation). The resulting signal is92
direction-dependent and thus the signal can be purposely93
distorted in other directions but the desired one. This approach94
can be used to enhance the security of multiuser multi-95
input multiple output (MIMO) communication systems when96
a multiantenna eavesdropper is present [9].97
The metric used to measure the security of the legitimate98
link is always the received signal to noise plus interference99
ratio (SINR) or the secrecy outage. The metric, such as100
the secrecy outage, is well known in literature and it is101
related to the quality of the legitimate link, given the position102
of transmitter and receiver, the transmit parameters (power,103
coding, beamforming, etc.), as well as the location of eaves-104
dropping nodes and interference sources. Other papers based105
on information-theoretical security typically use the metrics106
such as secrecy capacity or secrecy outage to measure the107
security level of the legitimate link by supposing to know the108
positions and the channel state information of the eavesdrop-109
pers and interferers. In order to drop out the dependance on the110
positions of the eavesdropping or interference nodes,1 a more111
general secrecy metric which is basically a characteristic of the112
network topology can be reached by averaging out the secrecy113
capacity over all the possible positions of eavesdroppers or114
interferers [13], [14]. Anyway, all the above mentioned papers115
deal with metrics which express a characteristic of the link,116
not of the surface where the link is immersed.117
B. Our Contribution118
The secrecy capacity is a good metric to evaluate how119
much is secure a single communication link. But in many120
practical scenarios a metric which is related to the specific121
environment can be more effective. For this reason we propose122
and test here a new metric which bonds the secrecy to the123
surface of the environment. We named this metric secrecy124
pressure, taking an analogy from the weather forecasting. The125
secrecy pressure is defined as the secrecy capacity insisting126
over the infinitesimal element of the surface. This metric can127
1The eavesdroppers and interferers are supposed to be spatially distributed
around the legitimate link with a point poisson process (PPP) distribution.
be used for several practical scopes: from deriving the secrecy 128
of a specific surface/environment, to calculate which is the 129
optimum transmitting antenna orientation or friendly jammer 130
position. 131
Differently from traditional metrics such as the conventional 132
secrecy capacity, our metric does not imply to know where Eve 133
is. To be more clear, in our approach the secrecy capacity is 134
calculated for each point (x, y) of a surface S. To do this we 135
suppose that Eve is located in (x, y). Then, we integrate over 136
x and y along the surface S, thus eliminating the dependence 137
on the position of the eavesdropper. The integration operation 138
is, de facto, as taking the average over the space (instead of 139
time). The resulting metric is the secrecy capacity than the 140
entire surface S has got. We call this metric secrecy pressure 141
since it tells how much security insists over a surface S. In 142
other words, we calculate how much secure is an environment, 143
given the position of Alice, Bob and (if present) interferers. 144
It is more practical because 1) we do not have to make any 145
assumptions on the position of the eavesdropper; 2) the new 146
metric is a property of the environment, and not of the point 147
where Eve is located; 3) we calculate a number which gives 148
an insight on how much secure is the environment were going 149
to transmit. The closest concept to this new metric is the 150
network secrecy developed by M. Win et al. [13]. The network 151
secrecy is a metric which evaluates the secrecy of an entire 152
network of nodes (not an environment). Legitimate nodes 153
and eavesdropping nodes are randomly distributed as Poisson 154
point processes (PPP). The secrecy capacity is calculated for 155
each legitimate link, given the position of the eavesdroppers. 156
The dependence on the eavesdroppers positions is dropped 157
by averaging out respect to all possible realization of the 158
PPP distribution of the eavesdropper nodes. 159
The paper also includes a general framework which eval- 160
uates the secrecy capacity over a surface. The framework 161
describes all the parameters affecting the secrecy capacity: 162
spatial distribution of the nodes (legitimate and interfering) 163
on a surface, antennas’ orientations and patterns, path loss and 164
fast fading statistics of the communication links, transmitting 165
powers. No hypothesis is made over the position of the 166
eavesdroppers, the metric is calculated over the entire surface, 167
as the eavesdropper could be in each point of the surface. 168
Static as well as statistical mobility model are supposed for the 169
eavesdropper. The results show how the metric can be useful 170
in giving an immediate insight on the leakage zones in the 171
surface, and how to adjust the parameters in order to maximize 172
the secrecy. The optimization problem is here formulated for 173
the transmitting antenna orientation and for the position of a 174
friendly jammer. 175
It is important to highlight that the secrecy pressure does 176
not need to know the position of the eavesdropper (Eve) 177
on the surface of interest. Typically the papers in literature 178
assume to know the position of Eve, which is usually an 179
unpractical assumption. The secrecy pressure or the secrecy 180
map parameters are calculated by assuming that Eve can 181
stay in each point of the surface. If no information about 182
eavesdropper is known, it could be located in any point of 183
the surface with equal probability. We did not introduce a 184





MUCCHI et al.: NEW METRIC FOR MEASURING THE SECURITY OF AN ENVIRONMENT 3
common approach, since we suppose that Eve can stay in each186
point of the surface. Typically, the PPP distribution is used187
to calculate how many eavesdroppers are within the range of188
the legitimate transmitter, and than average out the secrecy189
capacity. Our approach is different, we are interested in a190
new metric which is a characteristic of the surface. Anyway,191
a PPP distribution for the presence of Eve over the surface192
can be easily assumed in our case too. The secrecy pressure193
contains all the parameters that can cause a variation of the194
secrecy capacity, and thus it can be optimized respect to many195
(known) parameters (transmit antenna orientation, interference196
node positions or powers, etc.), separately or jointly.197
Another known metric in information-theoretical physical-198
layer security is the secrecy outage, i.e., the probability that199
the secrecy capacity is below a target rate. We have derived200
here the secrecy outage probability of a surface (SOPS). In this201
case we have supposed that the presence of Eve on the surface202
is not perfectly known, but it has an uncertain which we have203
modelled as a Gaussian distribution.204
The instant fading coefficient of Eve’s channel should be205
anyway known or estimated in order to derive the secrecy206
pressure instant by instant. This estimation can be relaxed207
if the evaluation of the secrecy pressure is done in ergodic208
channel. The ergodic secrecy pressure can be a useful tool in209
many practical applications.210
Practical applications of the propose metric could be tactical211
communications: a scenario in which the transmission cannot212
surely be overheard in a particular zone of the surface. Another213
scenario could be when the information cannot be leaked along214
a specific path or street, where the eavesdropper is supposed215
to move.216
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Sec. II217
describes the system model; the framework for the evaluation218
of the secrecy capacity over a surface is introduced, including219
all the parameters on which it depends, antenna orientation and220
pattern, nodes position and power, etc. In Sec. III, the new221
metric called secrecy pressure is defined. Sec. IV proposes222
the optimization problems, analytical solutions and graphs.223
In Sec. V some practical application scenarios are considered;224
antenna orientation as well as friendly jammer problems are225
solved in specific scenarios: from forbidden zone to mobility226
of the eavesdropper. In Sec. VI the closed-form of the secrecy227
outage probability of a surface is derived and discussed.228
Sec. VII concludes the paper.229
II. SYSTEM MODEL230
Consider a 2D surface S described by Cartesian coordinates231
(x, y). Into this space there are the legitimate transmitter232
(node i ) and receiver (node j ), as well as a given number233
of interferers Ik with k = 1, · · · , NI (Fig. 1). For better234
comprehension, let’s assume that the space is a geographical235
urban area, the transmitter is a base station, the receiver236
is a mobile terminal and the interferers are other base237
stations or access points. We do not assume any specific238
position for the eavesdropper in the space. In fact, we want239
to derive how the secrecy is mapped all over the given240
environment.241
Fig. 1. General scenario. Two legitimate nodes (i and j) want to exchange a
confidential message. They are immersed in an environment S together with
interfering nodes Ik . The eavesdropper node can be located anywhere over
the surface.
A. The Scenario 242
We assume to have a surface S where Alice and Bob are 243
located and their position is known (Fig. 3). In the environ- 244
ment S there are also interfering nodes, whose positions are 245
also known. Interfering nodes could be intentional jamming 246
sources or simply other systems (base stations) radiating in 247
the same frequency band of the legitimate transmission. To 248
simulate this scenario, the position of Alice and Bob was 249
chosen deterministically, while the position of the interfering 250
nodes were randomly selected, by using a Point Poisson 251
Process (PPP) distribution. The use of a PPP distribution for 252
interfering nodes dispersion around a receiver is common in 253
the literature, when dealing with security of wireless commu- 254
nications. Alice wants to transmit a confidential message M to 255
Bob. The legitimate receiver (Bob) tries to recover the message 256
from the observation vector Z B . The eavesdropper (Eve) can 257
be located anywhere in the surface S, and tries to recover 258
the message M by analyzing the observation vector Z E . The 259
wireless channels from Alice to Bob and to Eve are supposed 260
to be statistically independent. 261
B. Channel Model 262
Let us suppose to have two nodes on the surface S, 263
a transmitting node i with position (xi , yi ) and a receiving 264
node j with position (x j , y j ). The channel between node i 265
and node j is modeled as 266
Hi, j = hi, j (τ, ψ) · d−bi, j (1) 267
where di, j is the Euclidian distance between the nodes, b is 268
the path loss exponent and hi, j (τ, ψ) models the multipath 269
fading effect, including angular dispersion 270
hi, j (τ, ψ) =
L∑
l=1
h(l)i, j δ(τ − τl)δ(ψ − ψ j ) (2) 271
The parameter τl is the delay of arrival of the l-th path, while 272
ψl is the angle of arrival of the l-th path, i.e., τ and ψ 273
are modeling the time and angular dispersion of the multiple 274
echoes arriving at the receiver, respectively. The variable 275
h(l)i, j = a(l)i, j e−β
(l)
i, j denotes the channel coefficient, where a(l)i, j 276
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Fig. 2. Antenna pattern of the legitimate transmitter (Alice).








with σa representing the standard deviation of the Rayleigh280
distribution, and β(l)i, j is modeled as a stochastic random281
variable with uniform distribution in (0, 2π). Each link that282
connect two nodes on the surface is supposed to have a fading283
coefficient which is independent to all others.284
C. Received Power285
Let us suppose that the node i is transmitting with power Pi .286
The power received by the node j is287
Pj = Pi |Hi, j |2Gi (θi , φi, j )G j (θ j , φ j,i ) (3)288
where Gi (θi , φi, j ) is the antenna pattern gain of the289
transmitter, φi, j is the angle between the x-axis and the290
segment connecting node i and j , and θi is the angle between291
the x-axis and the direction of maximum radiation (main292
lobe) of i -node’s antenna. Fig. 2 shows the angles mentioned293
above, when node i is the legitimate transmitter, called Alice,294
and node j is the legitimate receiver, called Bob.295
Defining P̃i, j = Pi Gi (θi , φi, j )G j (θ j , φ j,i ) we can296
rewrite (3) as297
Pj = P̃i, j |Hi, j |2 (4)298
Given the position of node i and j on the surface S, the299
angles φi, j and φ j,i are fixed. Then, P̃i, j = P̃i, j (θi , θ j ).300
If, in addition, the receiving node j has isotropic antenna301
θ j = Const ∀ j , then P̃i, j = P̃i, j (θi ).302
According to [18] and [19], the time dispersion of the303
multipath at the receiver has an exponential distribution304
fτ (τ ) = 1
στ
e−(τ−τ0)/στ305








In order to average out the time and angular dispersion,309
the power Pj has to be integrated over all possible times and310
angles of arrival311





|hi, j (τ, ψ)|2 fτ (τ ) fψ(ψ)dτdψ (5)312
D. Aggregate Interference 313
Let us suppose that the NI interfering nodes are distributed 314
on the surface S following a point Poisson process (PPP) 315
distribution with density λ. The sum of the interference power 316




Pk Gk(θk, φk, j )G j (θ j , φ j,k)d
−2b




P̃k, j |Hk, j |2 (6) 319
where Pk is the power emitted by the k-th interfering node, 320
dk, j is the Euclidian distance between the k-th interfering 321
node and node j and hk, j is the channel coefficient associated 322
to the link (1). If the position of the NI interfering nodes 323
(xk, yk) with k = 1, · · · , NI is fixed, then P̃k, j = P̃k, j (θk, θ j ). 324
If, in addition, the receiving node j has isotropic antenna 325
θ j = Const ∀ j , then P̃k, j = P̃k, j (θk). In this case, the 326
aggregate interference I j is a random variable with Stable 327
distribution [16], [17] 328
I j ∼ S(α, 1, γ j ) (7) 329
where α = 1/b and 330













(2 − α) cos(πα/2) if α = 1
2
π
if α = 1
(8) 333
where () denotes the Gamma distribution function and E{} 334
the expectation operator. 335
The PDF of I j is 336
































is the characteristic function of the random variable I . 342
It is important to highlight that depending on the position 343
of the receiver j on the surface S, not all the NI interferers 344
could affect the receiver. The distance (path loss) d−2bk, j could 345
be close to zero, thus the node k does not contribute to the 346
aggregate interference at the receiver j . 347
III. SECRECY PRESSURE AND SECRECY FORCE 348
We want to define a new metric that allows to measure 349
the intensity of secrecy over a given surface. Taking analogy 350
from the atmospheric weather science, we define the concept 351
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Fig. 3. Scheme of the transmission of the confidential message M from
Alice to Bob.
Let us now associate the previous defined transmitting353
node i as Alice and the receiving node j as Bob. Alice is354
then located at point (xA, yA) and Bob at (xB, yB) on the355
surface S. The position of the eavesdropper Eve is not known,356
thus we suppose that its coordinates are generically (x, y).357
Suppose that Alice wants to transmit a confidential mes-358
sage M to Bob. Bob tries to recover the information M from359
the vector Z B received (Fig. 3). Given the model in Sec. II,360
the mutual information exchanged in the legitimate link (from361
Alice to Bob) is362
IB = I(M; Z B) = H(M)− H(M|Z B) (10)363
where H() denotes the entropy.364
Analogously, the eavesdropper (Eve) tries to recover the365
message M from the received vector Z E . Thus, the informa-366
tion stolen by Eve is367
IE = I(M; Z E ) = H(M)− H(M|Z E ) (11)368
The term I(M; Z E ) is called Leakage, and it denotes the369
amount of information on the message M that Eve is able370
to recover from the received vector Z E .371
As known, these two mutual information can be used to372
calculate the secrecy capacity [15]373
Csec = max
pM




IE = CB −CE (12)374
where CB and CE are the capacities of Bob’s and Eve’s375
channel, respectively, and pM is the marginal distribution of376
the codeword M . The secrecy capacity is at least as large as377
the difference between the legitimate channel capacity and the378
eavesdroppers channel capacity. The inequality can be strict379
as in the case of complex Gaussian wiretap channels [15],380
as well as typical wireless fading channels, which are here381
considered. It is important to note that both IB and IE depend382
on the channel state and position of Bob and Eve respect to383
Alice, respectively. This means that changing the position of384
Bob or Eve on the surface S, the mutual information changes.385
The capacity of the link between the transmitter, called386
Alice, positioned in (xA, yA), and the position (xB, yB) of387









Fig. 4. Secrecy map of surface S with Alice’s antenna orientation and
pattern. Three interfering nodes (I1, I2, I3) are present. The azimuth of Alice
transmission antenna is 6 deg.
where N0 denotes the Gaussian noise density at the receiver, 390
PB and IB are defined in (4) and (6), respectively. 391
Since typically we cannot know if an eavesdropper, called 392
Eve, is present in the surface S or where it is located, we 393
derive the capacity of a generic point (x, y) of the surface, 394
i.e., 395








where PE and IE are defined as in (4) and (6), respectively 397




Pk Gk(θk, φk,E )GE (θE , φE,k)d
−2b
k,E |hk,E |2 399
Thus, supposing that Eve is located in a generic point (x, y) 400
on the surface S, the secrecy capacity of the link between 401
Alice and Bob is 402
Csec(x, y)=max{0,CB −CE (x, y)}=[CB −CE (x, y)]+ (15) 403
It is important to highlight that the capacities here are intended 404
as conditioned to the state of the channels h A,B , h A,E , hk,B 405
and hk,E , as well as the state of the aggregate interference IB 406
and IE . 407
What we are proposing here is to define a secrecy capacity 408
for each elementary point (x, y) of the surface S. Using this 409
representation, we can elaborate a map of the secrecy of the 410
surface given the position of the known actors, i.e., legitimate 411
users and interfering nodes. In other words, given the positions 412
of Alice, Bob and interfering nodes Ik , for each point (x, y) of 413
the surface, we calculate the secrecy capacity of the legitimate 414
link as Eve was located in that point. The result is that we can 415
draw a map showing the different levels of secrecy of the entire 416
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Csec(x, y)dxdy = Fsec
AS
(16)419
where AS denotes the area of the surface S and the term Fsec420
is denoting what we define as Secrecy Force. The secrecy force421
depends on the locations of the legitimate users and interfering422
nodes, but not on the eavesdroppers. The metric psec is a useful423
parameter that indicates how much is secure a surface S, given424
the position of legitimate nodes and interfering nodes. Using425






sec < · · ·428
The index allows a ranking of a given spatial configuration of429
legitimate entities and interferes.430









0 if CB ≤ CE (x, y)
CB − CE (x, y) if CB > CE (x, y) dxdy433
(17)434
Since CB does not depend on (x, y), if the surface goes to435
infinity, the secrecy pressure tends to a constant value436
lim










This is because the path loss component d−2bA,E (x, y) in (3)439
vanishes as the generic point (x, y) on the surface S goes440
to infinity. In practice, the contributions that decrease the441
secrecy pressure mainly comes from the points on the surface442
close to the legitimate link. In other words, supposing to443
have an infinite surface, the set of points where Eve could be444
located that influence the secrecy capacity is limited, due to445
the path-loss. A point (x, y) too far away from the legitimate446
nodes cannot affect the secrecy capacity, since the legitimate447
signal is received with a too low power to observe anything448
(CE (x, y) = 0).449
From Eq. (15) we can derive another useful representation,450
called Secrecy Map. The Csec(x, y) in (15) is indicating451
which is the secrecy capacity insisting over the elementary452
unit surface dxdy located in a generic point (x, y) of the453
surface S (see Fig. 3). This representation can be used to454
draw the behaviour of the secrecy capacity over the surface S,455
showing zones where the secrecy is low or high, analogously456
to the weather forecast (Fig. 4). The map, in fact, is built by457
calculating the secrecy capacity of the legitimate link as the458
eavesdropper was located in each point of the surface. The blue459
zones in Fig. 4 indicate no secrecy, i.e., if the eavesdropper460
is set there, the secrecy rate of the legitimate link is zero.461
Summarizing, the secrecy map is derived by the following462
steps:463
1) take a surface with cartesian coordinates;464
2) locate the legitimate nodes (Alice and Bob) on the465
surface;466
3) compute the secrecy capacity of the legitimate link 467
assuming that Eve is located in a point (x,y) of the 468
surface; 469
4) associate that secrecy capacity to the corresponding 470
point of the surface; 471
5) repeat 3 and 4 for every point of the surface. 472
The secrecy capacity associated to a generic point of the 473
surface could be zero, i.e., any time Eve has a greater channel 474
capacity compared to Bob. 475
The secrecy map of the surface S changes with 476
• the positions of Alice, Bob and interfering nodes Ik 477
(k = 1, · · · , NI ); 478
• the pattern and the orientation G A(θA) of the legitimate 479
transmitter antenna; 480
• the power of the legitimate transmitter PA; 481
• the power of the transmitters of the interfering nodes Pk ; 482
• the state h A,B , h A,E , hk,B and hk,E of the channels. 483
The effect of time and angle dispersion at the receivers can 484
be averaged out by replacing P j with j = B in (13) and with 485
j = E in (14). 486
As listed in the above items, the secrecy capacity in (15) 487
depends on the instant fading coefficients h A,B , h A,E , hk,B 488
and hk,E . This means that the secrecy pressure (16) (and the 489
secrecy map) depends instantly on these processes. In order 490
to remove the dependance on the instantaneous realizations 491
of the fading coefficients, two solutions can be run: 1) put 492
the characteristic function of the fading coefficients into the 493
secrecy capacity formula and average it out, or more easily, 494
2) assume that the channels are ergodic. The results shown 495
in this paper are calculated by supposing ergodic channels. 496
Ergodic-fading model characterizes a situation in which the 497
duration of a coherence interval is on the order of the time 498
required to send a single symbol. The processes h A,B , h A,E , 499
hk,B and hk,E are mutually independent and i.i.d.; fading coef- 500
ficients change at every channel use and a symbol experiences 501
many fading realizations. 502
The ergodic secrecy capacity is thus [15] 503
C̃sec(x, y) = E|h A,B |2,|h A,E |2,|hk,B |2,|hk,E |2
{[CB − CE (x, y)]+
}
504
k = 1, · · · , NI (19) 505
where the operator E{} stands for the expectation. The ergodic 506
secrecy pressure is obtained by substituting the ergodic secrecy 507





C̃sec(x, y)dxdy (20) 509
Since C̃sec(x, y) could be zero in some points of the surface, 510
computing p̃sec implies to make an integral of an irregular 511
function. 512
It is important to point out that the power received by 513
Eve depends on the position of Eve, since path-loss, fading, 514
angle-of-departure, angle-of-arrival, as well as the power of 515
the aggregate interference are position-dependent parameters. 516
Therefore, in the expression of the capacity of both Bob 517
and Eve, the parameters are position-dependent. Since we 518
want a metric which is not dependent on the position of Eve 519
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Fig. 5. Secrecy pressure when the optimization problem is solved respect to
Alice’s antenna orientation.
we first locate Eve in each point (x,y) of the surface S, we521
calculate the secrecy capacity of each point (x,y) and then we522
integrate over the entire surface S. In this way, we take the523
mean over a space of the secrecy capacity, which eliminates524
the dependence of the secrecy capacity by specific position525
of Eve. The resulting (new) metric is a characteristic of the526
surface and not of the link, thus we called it secrecy pressure.527
IV. SECRECY OPTIMIZATION528
The secrecy pressure can be used as a useful metric to deter-529
mine which is the best configuration parameters to optimize530
the secrecy of a link. The proposed metric is suitable to find531
out different useful results, such as: a) which is the antenna532
orientation that assures highest secrecy towards the legitimate533
receiver; b) where is the best location where to put additional534
interfering node(s) in order to reach higher secrecy for the535
legitimate link; c) which is the best configuration of power536
emissions from the interfering nodes in order to have highest537
secrecy for the legitimate link.538
A. Antenna Orientation539
Let us suppose for simplicity that the interfering nodes Ik540
as well as Bob and Eve have isotropic antennas. Fixed the541
surface S, the positions of the legitimate nodes (Alice, Bob)542
and of the interfering nodes Ik (k = 1, · · · , NI ), and given the543
pattern of the transmitting antenna G A(θA), we can maximize544




Fig. 5 shows the secrecy map over the surface S when547
Eve is supposed to be set somewhere in the surface S and548
the optimization problem is solved respect to Alice’s antenna549
orientation. There exists an optimum azimuth orientation of550
Alice’s antenna. Given the positions of the legitimate users551
and interfering nodes, the best, from the secrecy capacity point552
of view, for Alice is not to point the maximum of the antenna553
pattern towards the direction of Bob. An azimuth orientation of554
+6 deg optimizes the secrecy capacity, in this case. In general,555
with the proposed metric it is possible to derive easily which is556
the best antenna orientation for the transmission to a legitimate557
receiver in a given perimeter, of which we know only the558
Fig. 6. Secrecy map for different positions of Eve (I, II, III and IV quadrant)
when the optimization problem is solved respect to Alice’s antenna orientation.
Fig. 7. Secrecy map over the surface S when the optimization problem is
solved respect to the position of the additional interfering node (flasher).
positions of the interferers (e.g., other access points or base 559
stations). Fig. 6 shows the secrecy map over the surface S 560
for different positions of Eve (I, II, III and IV quadrant) when 561
the optimization problem is solved respect to Alice’s antenna 562
orientation. As an example, suppose that the legitimate users 563
do want to minimize the information leakage in a specific 564
zone of the surface (e.g., the eavesdropper is suspected to be 565
in the third quadrant), then the optimum antenna orientation 566
for Alice is +16 deg (green curve in Fig. 6). 567
B. Interfering Node Positions 568
Fixed the surface S, the positions of the legitimate nodes 569
(Alice, Bob) and given the pattern and orientation of the 570
transmitting antenna G A(θA), we can maximize the secrecy 571
pressure over the position (xk, yk) of the NI +1-th interfering 572
node, a friendly jammer called here flasher, in order to 573
maximize the secrecy pressure of the legitimate link, given 574




Fig. 7 shows the secrecy map over the surface S when the 577
optimization problem (22) is solved. As it can be seen, there 578
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Fig. 8. Optimization of both position and power of the additional interfering
node (flasher).
can be put which optimize the secrecy pressure metric. Like580
forecast weather, the areas with same color bring the same581
secrecy capacity, if the additional interfering node (friendly582
jammer) is installed in that point of the surface. Another583
evident result is that the interfering node cannot be placed584
close to Bob (white hole in Fig. 7), since the this would585
decrease drastically the capacity of the legitimate link and thus586
the secrecy capacity. Fig. 8(a) shows the same secrecy map in587
the case that Eve is supposed to be somewhere in a limited588
perimeter (the green dotted line) inside the surface S. In this589
case the optimum area is modified compared to the previous590
scenario.591
C. Power Allocation of the Interferers592
Fixed the surface S, the positions of the legitimate nodes593
(Alice, Bob) and of the interfering nodes2 Ik , and given the594
pattern and orientation of the transmitting antenna G A(θA),595
2The position of the interfering nodes has been randomly selected by using
a PPP distribution.
we can maximize the secrecy pressure respect to the power 596
emitted by the interfering nodes 597
arg max
Pk
{psec} k = 1, · · · , NI (23) 598
To ease the illustration of this optimization, let us suppose to 599
put an additional interfering node (the 4th) in the scenario and 600
to optimize its transmit power. Figs. 8(a) shows the secrecy 601
map over the surface S when the optimization problem is 602
solved respect to the position of the additional interfering node 603
(flasher) and its power. The eavesdropper is supposed to be 604
located somewhere in a limited perimeter (the green dotted line 605
in the figure) of the surface. The lighter zone of the secrecy 606
map denotes the set of points (x,y) where the flasher can be 607
located to yield the highest secrecy pressure. Fig. 8(b) shows 608
the secrecy pressure as a function of the power of the flasher. 609
The curve evidently shows an optimum point, which in that 610
case is about −9 dB. 611
It is important to stress that using the proposed metric the 612
optimum antenna orientation is not trivially in the direction of 613
the legitimate receiver, as well as the optimum position and 614
power of the intentional jammer (flasher) are not those that 615
the common sense would suggest. 616
D. Joint Optimization 617
Joint optimization of all the parameters (antenna orientation, 618




{psec} k = 1, · · · , NI (24) 621
Graphical results of this optimization are not shown in this 622
paper due to the lack of space. 623
E. Varying the Position of Bob 624
Although the most practical scenario is when Alice and Bob 625
are fixed and Eve can be everywhere in a limited space, as 626
previously described, one could also be interested in using the 627
proposed metric to draw the map of the secrecy pressure when 628
Bob’s position can vary over the surface S. In this case, the 629
steps to draw the map are the following 630
• locate the legitimate receiver (Bob) in a point (x, y) of 631
the surface S; 632
• calculate the secrecy pressure metric (20) for Bob located 633
in that point; 634
• assign to the point (x, y) the value of the secrecy pres- 635
sure; 636
• repeat these points until all the surface S is evaluated. 637
Fig 9(a) shows the map of the secrecy pressure when Bob’s 638
position varies over the surface and Eve’s position varies over 639
the entire surface as well. As expected the secrecy pressure is 640
higher when Bob is inside the main lobe of Alice, while the 641
secrecy pressure decreases drastically when Bob is closer to 642
an interferer. 643
Fig 9(b) shows the map of the secrecy pressure when 644
Bob’s position vary over the surface and Eve’s position 645
varies only in a limited perimeter (the green dashed line). 646
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Fig. 9. Map of the secrecy pressure. The secrecy pressure is calculated as
Bob was in each point (x, y) of the surface S.
the surface S, the zone of maximum secrecy pressure is larger648
and located around the main lobe of Alice. Please note that the649
secrecy pressure behind Alice, e.g. the point (−4,−2), is low650
since there is almost no power from Alice in that direction.651
V. GENERAL DEFINITION OF SECRECY PRESSURE652
AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS653
As stated in the previous sections, the new metric is defined654
starting from the definition of the well-known secrecy capacity655
(Csec). To eliminate the dependence on the position of the656
eavesdropper of the secrecy capacity, we have averaged out657
the secrecy capacity by integrating the Csec over the 2D-space658
of the specific surface S. The resulting metric is called secrecy659
pressure and it is the analytical expression of the average over 660
a space (instead of time). The integral of the Csec function is 661
not easy to derive, since Csec shows sparsely zeros over the 662
2D surface, each time that the capacity of Eve is greater of 663
the capacity of Bob. A closed-form expression of the secrecy 664
pressure is not easy to obtain, even for simple geometry shape 665
like circle or square with generic boundaries. For this reason, 666
we have derived the closed-form expression of the secrecy 667
outage of a surface (see Sec. VI). Although a closed-form 668
expression of the secrecy pressure for a known shape is not 669
shown in the paper, this does not mean that the metric makes 670
no sense. The metric is defined as the spatial average of the 671
secrecy capacity calculated for every point of the surface S. 672
The average of the secrecy capacity over time is called ergodic 673
secrecy capacity in the literature, but no previous paper, in our 674
knowledge, presented the spatial average. 675
This metric shows the secrecy as a characteristic of a 676
surface and not of a single link. This is useful in many 677
practical scenarios, like military tactical scenarios. Typically, 678
military command has a specific perimeter of operation, where 679
the presence of the enemy is not perfectly known, based 680
on the information that the intelligence service or technolo- 681
gies (satellite, etc.) can collect. Most probably, the military 682
command can delimit the presence of the enemy in some 683
zones of the operational scenario, associating the presence 684
of the enemy with a certain probability. By calculating the 685
secrecy pressure, the military command can: 1) quantify how 686
much secure is one perimeter from the point of view of the 687
wireless transmissions; 2) decide the optimum angle for the 688
transmitting antenna array; 3) decide which is the optimum 689
position to place a jammer to enhance the security of the 690
transmission; 4) decide the optimum power of the jammer, 691
in order not to degrade the reception of the legitimate receiver 692
while jamming the potential eavesdropper; 5) operate a multi- 693
parameter optimization; 6) if the position of the eavesdropper 694
is only partially known, the military command can draw 695
zones in the operational perimeter giving to each of them a 696
statistical probability of Eve presence, and then compute the 697
secrecy of the perimeter; 7) if a mobility model of Eve is 698
known or partially (statistically) known, again all the above 699
mentioned parameters (antenna orientation, friendly jammer 700
position, etc.) can be optimized. Other optimizations can be 701
further imagined. 702
As discussed above, in many practical situations we do not 703
know if an eavesdropper is present and where it is located 704
exactly. Thus, we define a probability of presence of Eve to 705
be associated to a generic point (x, y) on the surface S 706






υX,Y (x, y)dxdy (25) 708
where υX,Y (x, y) is the probability density function (PDF) of 709
the presence of Eve in (x, y). From now on we call this PDF 710
υE (x, y). 711
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Fig. 10. Forbidden zone inside the surface S.
where Csec(x, y) = [CB − CE (x, y)]+ and
∫∫
υE (x, y)714
dxdy = 1. Eq. (26) represents the more general expression715
of the secrecy pressure in (16). For example, if a uniform716
distribution of Eve’s presence is supposed for the entire717
surface S, the PDF would be υE (x, y) = 1/AS and thus718 ∫∫
S 1/ASdxdy = 1.719
In the following sections three practical scenarios are pro-720
posed to show the benefits of the new proposed metric.721
In particular, the secrecy pressure is computed when722
• an eavesdropper is known to be in a sub-region of the723
surface S (leakage zone),724
• the eavesdropper position is known with a probability725
spatial function (Gaussian approximation), and726
• when the eavesdropper has not a fixed position (mobility727
scenario).728
In all these cases, some simplifications are assumed729
• the average fading of the channels is supposed to be 1,730
i.e.,
∑
l |h(l)i, j |2 = 1;731
• the antenna pattern of Bob, Eve and of the interfering732
nodes is supposed to be isotropic. Only Alice has a733
directive antenna and can modify the antenna orientation;734
• the position of Alice and Bob on the surface S is supposed735
to be fixed and known: (−4, 0) and (0, 0), respectively;736
• the position of the interfering nodes (I1,I2,I3) is supposed737
to be fixed and known: (−2, 4), (1,−3) and (3, 3),738
respectively.739
A. Leakage Zone740
In many real situations, e.g., in military scenarios, the741
transmitter does not want to leak information in fixed zone,742
in a region where it knows that an eavesdropper is surely743
present. We name here the leakage zone as forbidden zone,744
since the legitimate transmitter surely does not want to leak745
any information in that zone. Fig. 10 shows the surface S with746
the forbidden zone SF inside. In this example the forbidden747
zone is the third quadrant.748
To each point of the surface SF we associate a probability749
of Eve’s presence such that
∫∫
SF
υE (S)dxdy = 1, while in750
the rest of the surface S we set
∫∫
¬SF υE (S)dxdy = 0, where751 ¬SF denotes the complementary surface SF ∪ ¬SF = S.752
Assume, as an example, to have an equal distribution753
of the probability of Eve’s presence in the surface SF .754
Fig. 11. Gaussian distribution of Eve’s presence inside the surface S.
Than, 755






, if x ∈ [0, xE ] and y ∈ [0, yE ]
0, otherwise
(27) 756






υE (x, y)Csec(x, y)dxdy (28) 758
The secrecy map f the surface can be drawn by using the 759
following result 760











0 CE (x, y)dxdy otherwise
762
(29) 763
The optimization of the secrecy pressure respect to the 764
azimuth of the transmitting antenna of the legitimate node 765
(Alice) for a forbidden zone is shown in Fig. 5. 766
B. Gaussian Probability of Eavesdropper Presence 767
In other situations, it is not known exactly if eavesdroppers 768
are present or not. Only suspicious. In this case, located a 769
point on the map, a probability of presence of Eve with 770
certain distribution can be associated. We suppose here that 771
a Gaussian spatial distribution of Eve’s presence is associated 772
to a zone of the surface S. To each point of the surface 773
S we associate a probability of Eve’s presence υE which 774
is a random variable with Gaussian distribution centered in 775
(xE , yE ) (Fig. 11). The circle lines denotes the intensity of 776
the probability. For example, if the Gaussian random variable 777
denoting the presence of Eve on the surface has mean 0.8 and 778
variance 1, we associate a probability of Eve’s presence equal 779
to 0.8 to the point (xE , yE ). 780




υE (x, y)Csec(x, y)dxdy (30) 782




2σE , where σE indicates the 783
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The secrecy map of the surface can be drawn by using the785
following result786
υE (x, y)Csec(x, y)dxdy787
=
{
0 if Csec(x, y) ≤ 0
CB −
∫∫
S υE (x, y)CE (x, y)dxdy otherwise
788
(31)789
This scenario is a particular case of the mobility scenario790
described in the next section, the results can be appreciated791
in Fig. 13(b).792
C. Mobility Model for the Eavesdropper793
If we know the position of Eve at time tn , we can associate794
to the eavesdropper a statistical mobility model and derive the795
secrecy pressure over a surface of interest. The mobility model796
for Eve depends on its movement capability in the specific797
environment. In the absence of prior information on the real798
movement of the eavesdropper (i.e., Eve is free to move in all799
directions with different speeds), the Gaussian mobility model800
represents a fairly general model with a tractable number of801
parameters. In the presence of some prior information on the802
eavesdroppers movement (e.g., direction or speed is set by the803
environment), a mobility model more tight to the real mobility804
would provide better performance.805
Optimization of the secrecy pressure is shown respect to806
the azimuth of the legitimate transmitting antenna as well as807
respect to the position of the flasher.808
We consider here Gaussian mobility model with conditional809
PDF of current position conditioned on the previous position.810
For easier notation, let us define the position (x, y) at time tn811
of a point on the surface S as a vector pn . Thus, the conditional812
PDF of current position is813
υm(pn|pn−1) = 1





(pn−µn )T−1m (pn−µn )
]
(32)814
where µn varies with the mobility model as described in815
the following, and the covariance matrix m accounts for816








where σm,x and σm,y is the standard deviation along the x and820
y axes, respectively. The parameter ρ takes into account the821
possible inter-dependence of the two coordinates. Independent822
coordinates have ρ = 0.823
The mean µn depends on the position pn−1 and the speed824
vn−1 according to825
µn = pn−1 + vn−1(tn − tn−1) (34)826
where vn−1 is the vector of the speed along x and y axes at827
time tn−1.828
Fig. 12 shows the secrecy map over the surface S as a829
function of the position of the flasher (22) and with mobility830
model for the eavesdropper (32). Eve is suspected to move831
vertically from its previous position, with a mobility model832
given by (32). The interfering nodes I1, I2 and I3 are fixed.833
Fig. 12. Secrecy map of the position of the flasher with mobility model for
the eavesdropper.
Solving (22) gives the optimum point where to locate the 834
additional flasher I4. Best is to put the flasher close to the 835
point where the eavesdropper is supposed to arrive. This is 836
somehow trivial. 837
In order to complicate the scenario we supposed that Eve is 838
moving from (3,−3) to (3, 3) with a mobility model given 839
by (32) (see Fig. 13(a)) in six time steps. Alice antenna 840
azimuth orientation can vary from −30 to +30 deg. The 841
resulting map of the secrecy pressure is shown in Fig. 13(b). 842
The map shows which is the optimum transmit antenna 843
orientation (azimuth) at each time step. As an example, at 844
time step 6, Eve is stochastically supposed to be in (3, 3) 845
and thus an orientation between −18 to +8 deg optimizes 846
the secrecy capacity for the Eve’s mobility scenario. In this 847
case the secrecy rate achievable is more than 3.20 bps. On the 848
contrary, at time step 3 the maximum secrecy rate achievable is 849
1.28 bps with an antenna orientation range of (−26,−20) deg. 850
VI. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY 851
OF A SURFACE (SOPS) 852
A closed-form of the secrecy pressure is not easy to be 853
derived. Another interesting metric could be the outage prob- 854
ability of the secrecy capacity over a surface. A secure outage 855
occurs when the instantaneous secrecy capacity Csec(x, y) is 856
less than target secrecy rate Rsec. Thus, the secure outage 857
probability is defined as 858
Pout (Rsec)(x, y) = Prob{Csec(x, y) < Rsec} (35) 859
Note that the outage probability depends on the location (x, y) 860
of the eavesdropper over the surface. Given the result above, 861














12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
Fig. 13. Eve’s mobility: scenario description and secrecy map over azimuth
of Alice’s antenna.
The secrecy outage probability of a surface depends on866
the probability υE (x, y) that Eve is located in the point a867
generic point (x, y) of the surface. An interesting behaviour868
to study is the existence of the secrecy capacity over a869
surface, i.e., when Rsec is set to zero. In this case the SOPS870
becomes871
Aout(Rsec = 0) =
∫∫
S
Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0}υE (x, y)dxdy872
(37)873
The term υE (x, y) is the distribution of the presence of Eve874
over the surface, which could be uniform or Gaussian or875
any other distribution, based on what it is known about the876
eavesdroppers. The term Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0} can be derived877
as878
Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0}=Prob{SN RE (x, y)≥ SN RB } (38)879
where 880
SN RB = PB
N0 + IB (39) 881
SN RE (x, y) = PE
N0 + IE (40) 882
with PB , PE defined as in (3) and IB , IE as in (6). 883
Eq. (38) is hard to be calculated analytically, since the term 884
at numerator PB is Rayleigh distributed, while the term at 885
the denominator IB is Stable distributed. A closed form can 886
be reached if we assume that the Gaussian approximation is 887
valid for the aggregate interference, i.e., IB ∼ N (0, NB ) and 888
IE ∼ N (0, NE ). In this case Eq. (41) becomes 889
SN RB = PB
N0 + NB (41) 890
SN RE (x, y) = PE
N0 + NE (42) 891
and Eq. (38) can be written as [20] 892
Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0} = Prob{SN RE (x, y) ≥ SN RB } 893
= SN R E (x, y)






A,i E{|h A,i |2}
N0 + Ni 896
with i = {B, E} and E{} is the expectation operator. 897






SN R E (x, y)
SN R B + SN R E (x, y)
υE (x, y)dxdy 899
(44) 900
In the case of a target secrecy rate greater than zero Rsec > 0, 901













SN R B · exp
{
− 2Rsec−1
S N R B
}
SN R B + 2Rsec SN R E (x, y)
⎞
⎟⎠υE (x, y)dxdy 905
(45) 906
The results of the SOPS are shown in Fig. 14. The curves are 907
derived by supposing a Gaussian distribution of the presence 908
of Eve on the surface, i.e., 909





The other parameters are set as follows: E{|h A,i |2} = 1 with 911
i = {B, E}, σE ranges from 0.2 to 5. 912
Fig. 14 shows the SOPS (Aout(Rsec = 0)) as a function of 913
the standard deviation σE of the distribution of Eve’s presence 914
on the surface S. Eve is located in three different positions: at 915
Alice’s, at Bob’s and at the first interferer’s I1. The positions 916
of Alice, Bob and the interferers I1, I2 and I3 are shown 917
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Fig. 14. Secrecy outage of the surface S as a function of the standard
deviation σE of the distribution of Eve’s presence over S. Eve’s distribution
is Gaussian and centered in three different positions: at Alice’s, at Bob’s and
at the first interferer’s I1.
Fig. 15. Secrecy pressure outage map of the surface S.
The orange dotted line in Fig. 14 reports the results when919
Eve’s distribution is centered on the same position of Alice.920
The curve of the SOPS confirms that a higher dispersion of the921
probability of Eve’s presence yields a lower surface secrecy922
outage. This is logic, since a higher variance of the Gaussian923
distribution means higher probability that Eve is located far924
away from Alice. The green dashed line in Fig. 14 reports925
the results when Eve’s distribution is centered on the same926
position of the first interferer I1. The curve of the SOPS, in927
this case, are completely different from the previous one, as928
expected. The SOPS increases with the variance σE , since929
a higher dispersion of the position of Eve means a higher930
probability that Eve is located far away from the interference931
source, which jams Eve’s receiver.932
The blue solid line in Fig. 14 reports the results when933
Eve’s distribution is centered on Bob’s position. The SOPS934
increases with the variance σE , since a higher dispersion of935
the position of Eve means a higher probability that Eve is936
located closer to the source of the information (Alice), i.e.,937
Eve’s could have a better signal to noise ratio compared938
to Bob.939
The secrecy pressure outage map of the entire surface is 940
shown in Fig. 15. 941
VII. CONCLUSIONS 942
This paper proposes and studies a new metric for measuring 943
the secrecy potentials of a surface. This metric is defined 944
secrecy pressure. Using the metric different environments or 945
surfaces can be ordered as a function of the secrecy rate 946
that can be assured. The metric can be used also for solving 947
optimization problems, e.g., finding which is the best transmit 948
antenna orientation to maximize the secrecy capacity of the 949
surface, or finding which is the best position of an addi- 950
tional interfering node (friendly jammer). Different practical 951
scenarios are investigated, including mobility option for the 952
eavesdropper. Another metric, the secrecy outage probability 953
of a surface (SOPS), is derived. In this case the presence of 954
Eve is supposed to be uncertain, and modelled as a Gaussian 955
distribution over the surface. The results of the SOPS are 956
shown as a function of the dispersion of Eve’s position. The 957
Gaussian distribution is centered in three specific points: at 958
Alice’s, at Bob’s and at the first interferer’s. 959
In addition the first part of the paper includes a general 960
framework to evaluate the secrecy capacity over a surface. The 961
framework includes all the parameters affecting the secrecy 962
capacity, from nodes spatial distribution, to antenna orientation 963
and pattern, and propagation medium statistics. 964
This paper offers a new perspective on the role of secrecy 965
over a surface, considering nodes spatial distribution, wireless 966
propagation medium, and aggregate network interference. 967
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A New Metric for Measuring the Security of
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Abstract— Information-theoretical approaches can ensure1
security, regardless of the computational power of the attackers.2
Requirements for the application of this theory are: 1) assuring3
an advantage over the eavesdropper quality of reception and4
2) knowing where the eavesdropper is. The traditional metrics5
are the secrecy capacity or outage, which are both related to6
the quality of the legitimate link against the eavesdropper link.7
Our goal is to define a new metric, which is the characteristic8
of the security of the surface/environment where the legitimate9
link is immersed, regardless of the position of the eavesdropping10
node. The contribution of this paper is twofold: 1) a general11
framework for the derivation of the secrecy capacity of a surface,12
which considers all the parameters that influence the secrecy13
capacity and 2) the definition of a new metric to measure the14
secrecy of a surface: the secrecy pressure. The metric can be15
also visualized as a secrecy map, analogously to weather forecast.16
Different application scenarios are shown: from “forbidden zone”17
to Gaussian mobility model for the eavesdropper. Moreover, the18
secrecy outage probability of a surface is derived. This additional19
metric can measure, which is the secrecy rate supportable by the20
specific environment.21
Index Terms— Physical-layer security, secrecy pressure, secrecy22
capacity, secrecy outage, security of wireless communications.23
I. INTRODUCTION24
IN WIRELESS networks, transmission between legitimate25 nodes can easily be intercepted by an eavesdropper due26
to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. This makes27
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wireless transmissions highly vulnerable to eavesdropping 28
attacks. Existing communications systems typically adopt 29
cryptographic techniques in order to achieve confidential trans- 30
mission, to prevent an eavesdropper from interpreting data 31
transmission between legitimate users. 32
It is known that encrypted transmission is not perfectly 33
secure, since the cipher text can still be decrypted by an eaves- 34
dropper through a brute-force attack, an exhaustive search of 35
the encryption key into the cipher text. 36
To this end, physical-layer security is an emerging alter- 37
native paradigm to protect wireless communications against 38
eavesdropping attacks, including brute-force attacks. In fact, 39
the security of cryptographic techniques is implicitly set into 40
the practical assumption that the attacker does not have enough 41
computational power to hack the cipher text in a reasonable 42
amount of time. Thus, security of encryption algorithm cannot 43
be measured exactly. On the contrary, information-theoretical 44
physical-layer security does not need to make any assumption 45
of the computational power of the attacker, and, in addition, 46
the security of a communication link can be exactly measured. 47
Physical-layer security work was pioneered by Shannon 48
and evolved by Wyner in [1], where a discrete memoryless 49
wiretap channel was examined for secure communications 50
in the presence of an eavesdropper. Perfectly secure data 51
transmission can be achieved if the channel capacity of the 52
legitimate link is higher than the eavesdropper link (from 53
source to eavesdropper). In [2], Wyners results were extended 54
to Gaussian wiretap channel: a new metric, the secrecy capac- 55
ity, was proposed. The secrecy capacity was derived as the 56
difference between the channel capacity of the legitimate 57
link and of the eavesdropper link. If the secrecy capacity 58
is above zero, the legitimate source can adapt the data rate 59
in order to let the destination decode the information, while 60
the data overheard by the eavesdropper is too few and noisy 61
to be decoded. If the secrecy capacity falls below zero, the 62
transmission from source to destination becomes completely 63
insecure, and the eavesdropper can succeed in interpreting the 64
data. In order to improve the security against eavesdropping 65
attacks, one solution is to reduce the probability of occurrence 66
of an intercept event through enlarging the secrecy capacity. 67
As a consequence, there are extensive works aimed at 68
increasing the secrecy capacity of wireless communications by 69
exploiting multiple antennas [3] and/or cooperative relays [4]. 70
A. Related Works 71
There are some examples in literature of papers attempting 72
to create a physical region to face the randomness of the 73
1536-1276 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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eavesdropper location and/or the amplitude fluctuation due74
to fading. All these attempts are basically based on the use75
of multiple antennas and beamforming [5], [10]–[12]. These76
works aim at building a region as small as possible where the77
message can be considered secure. The region is built by using78
beamforming and/or antenna coding between the legitimate79
transmitter and receiver, or with the help of friendly surround-80
ing nodes (artificial noise injection, jamming). Actually, the81
definition of the physical region can differ from paper to paper,82
but mainly beamforming or jamming are used in the works83
based on information-theoretical parameters, in the form of84
antenna arrays [10] or distributed antennas [5].85
In [6] secrecy rate maximization and power consump-86
tion minimization for a multiple-inputmultiple-output (MIMO)87
secrecy channel is investigated. A multiantenna cooperative88
jammer is employed to improve secret communication in89
the presence of a multiantenna eavesdropper. In [7] and [8]90
a phase-shifting array is used to produce security in a given91
direction (directional modulation). The resulting signal is92
direction-dependent and thus the signal can be purposely93
distorted in other directions but the desired one. This approach94
can be used to enhance the security of multiuser multi-95
input multiple output (MIMO) communication systems when96
a multiantenna eavesdropper is present [9].97
The metric used to measure the security of the legitimate98
link is always the received signal to noise plus interference99
ratio (SINR) or the secrecy outage. The metric, such as100
the secrecy outage, is well known in literature and it is101
related to the quality of the legitimate link, given the position102
of transmitter and receiver, the transmit parameters (power,103
coding, beamforming, etc.), as well as the location of eaves-104
dropping nodes and interference sources. Other papers based105
on information-theoretical security typically use the metrics106
such as secrecy capacity or secrecy outage to measure the107
security level of the legitimate link by supposing to know the108
positions and the channel state information of the eavesdrop-109
pers and interferers. In order to drop out the dependance on the110
positions of the eavesdropping or interference nodes,1 a more111
general secrecy metric which is basically a characteristic of the112
network topology can be reached by averaging out the secrecy113
capacity over all the possible positions of eavesdroppers or114
interferers [13], [14]. Anyway, all the above mentioned papers115
deal with metrics which express a characteristic of the link,116
not of the surface where the link is immersed.117
B. Our Contribution118
The secrecy capacity is a good metric to evaluate how119
much is secure a single communication link. But in many120
practical scenarios a metric which is related to the specific121
environment can be more effective. For this reason we propose122
and test here a new metric which bonds the secrecy to the123
surface of the environment. We named this metric secrecy124
pressure, taking an analogy from the weather forecasting. The125
secrecy pressure is defined as the secrecy capacity insisting126
over the infinitesimal element of the surface. This metric can127
1The eavesdroppers and interferers are supposed to be spatially distributed
around the legitimate link with a point poisson process (PPP) distribution.
be used for several practical scopes: from deriving the secrecy 128
of a specific surface/environment, to calculate which is the 129
optimum transmitting antenna orientation or friendly jammer 130
position. 131
Differently from traditional metrics such as the conventional 132
secrecy capacity, our metric does not imply to know where Eve 133
is. To be more clear, in our approach the secrecy capacity is 134
calculated for each point (x, y) of a surface S. To do this we 135
suppose that Eve is located in (x, y). Then, we integrate over 136
x and y along the surface S, thus eliminating the dependence 137
on the position of the eavesdropper. The integration operation 138
is, de facto, as taking the average over the space (instead of 139
time). The resulting metric is the secrecy capacity than the 140
entire surface S has got. We call this metric secrecy pressure 141
since it tells how much security insists over a surface S. In 142
other words, we calculate how much secure is an environment, 143
given the position of Alice, Bob and (if present) interferers. 144
It is more practical because 1) we do not have to make any 145
assumptions on the position of the eavesdropper; 2) the new 146
metric is a property of the environment, and not of the point 147
where Eve is located; 3) we calculate a number which gives 148
an insight on how much secure is the environment were going 149
to transmit. The closest concept to this new metric is the 150
network secrecy developed by M. Win et al. [13]. The network 151
secrecy is a metric which evaluates the secrecy of an entire 152
network of nodes (not an environment). Legitimate nodes 153
and eavesdropping nodes are randomly distributed as Poisson 154
point processes (PPP). The secrecy capacity is calculated for 155
each legitimate link, given the position of the eavesdroppers. 156
The dependence on the eavesdroppers positions is dropped 157
by averaging out respect to all possible realization of the 158
PPP distribution of the eavesdropper nodes. 159
The paper also includes a general framework which eval- 160
uates the secrecy capacity over a surface. The framework 161
describes all the parameters affecting the secrecy capacity: 162
spatial distribution of the nodes (legitimate and interfering) 163
on a surface, antennas’ orientations and patterns, path loss and 164
fast fading statistics of the communication links, transmitting 165
powers. No hypothesis is made over the position of the 166
eavesdroppers, the metric is calculated over the entire surface, 167
as the eavesdropper could be in each point of the surface. 168
Static as well as statistical mobility model are supposed for the 169
eavesdropper. The results show how the metric can be useful 170
in giving an immediate insight on the leakage zones in the 171
surface, and how to adjust the parameters in order to maximize 172
the secrecy. The optimization problem is here formulated for 173
the transmitting antenna orientation and for the position of a 174
friendly jammer. 175
It is important to highlight that the secrecy pressure does 176
not need to know the position of the eavesdropper (Eve) 177
on the surface of interest. Typically the papers in literature 178
assume to know the position of Eve, which is usually an 179
unpractical assumption. The secrecy pressure or the secrecy 180
map parameters are calculated by assuming that Eve can 181
stay in each point of the surface. If no information about 182
eavesdropper is known, it could be located in any point of 183
the surface with equal probability. We did not introduce a 184
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common approach, since we suppose that Eve can stay in each186
point of the surface. Typically, the PPP distribution is used187
to calculate how many eavesdroppers are within the range of188
the legitimate transmitter, and than average out the secrecy189
capacity. Our approach is different, we are interested in a190
new metric which is a characteristic of the surface. Anyway,191
a PPP distribution for the presence of Eve over the surface192
can be easily assumed in our case too. The secrecy pressure193
contains all the parameters that can cause a variation of the194
secrecy capacity, and thus it can be optimized respect to many195
(known) parameters (transmit antenna orientation, interference196
node positions or powers, etc.), separately or jointly.197
Another known metric in information-theoretical physical-198
layer security is the secrecy outage, i.e., the probability that199
the secrecy capacity is below a target rate. We have derived200
here the secrecy outage probability of a surface (SOPS). In this201
case we have supposed that the presence of Eve on the surface202
is not perfectly known, but it has an uncertain which we have203
modelled as a Gaussian distribution.204
The instant fading coefficient of Eve’s channel should be205
anyway known or estimated in order to derive the secrecy206
pressure instant by instant. This estimation can be relaxed207
if the evaluation of the secrecy pressure is done in ergodic208
channel. The ergodic secrecy pressure can be a useful tool in209
many practical applications.210
Practical applications of the propose metric could be tactical211
communications: a scenario in which the transmission cannot212
surely be overheard in a particular zone of the surface. Another213
scenario could be when the information cannot be leaked along214
a specific path or street, where the eavesdropper is supposed215
to move.216
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Sec. II217
describes the system model; the framework for the evaluation218
of the secrecy capacity over a surface is introduced, including219
all the parameters on which it depends, antenna orientation and220
pattern, nodes position and power, etc. In Sec. III, the new221
metric called secrecy pressure is defined. Sec. IV proposes222
the optimization problems, analytical solutions and graphs.223
In Sec. V some practical application scenarios are considered;224
antenna orientation as well as friendly jammer problems are225
solved in specific scenarios: from forbidden zone to mobility226
of the eavesdropper. In Sec. VI the closed-form of the secrecy227
outage probability of a surface is derived and discussed.228
Sec. VII concludes the paper.229
II. SYSTEM MODEL230
Consider a 2D surface S described by Cartesian coordinates231
(x, y). Into this space there are the legitimate transmitter232
(node i ) and receiver (node j ), as well as a given number233
of interferers Ik with k = 1, · · · , NI (Fig. 1). For better234
comprehension, let’s assume that the space is a geographical235
urban area, the transmitter is a base station, the receiver236
is a mobile terminal and the interferers are other base237
stations or access points. We do not assume any specific238
position for the eavesdropper in the space. In fact, we want239
to derive how the secrecy is mapped all over the given240
environment.241
Fig. 1. General scenario. Two legitimate nodes (i and j) want to exchange a
confidential message. They are immersed in an environment S together with
interfering nodes Ik . The eavesdropper node can be located anywhere over
the surface.
A. The Scenario 242
We assume to have a surface S where Alice and Bob are 243
located and their position is known (Fig. 3). In the environ- 244
ment S there are also interfering nodes, whose positions are 245
also known. Interfering nodes could be intentional jamming 246
sources or simply other systems (base stations) radiating in 247
the same frequency band of the legitimate transmission. To 248
simulate this scenario, the position of Alice and Bob was 249
chosen deterministically, while the position of the interfering 250
nodes were randomly selected, by using a Point Poisson 251
Process (PPP) distribution. The use of a PPP distribution for 252
interfering nodes dispersion around a receiver is common in 253
the literature, when dealing with security of wireless commu- 254
nications. Alice wants to transmit a confidential message M to 255
Bob. The legitimate receiver (Bob) tries to recover the message 256
from the observation vector Z B . The eavesdropper (Eve) can 257
be located anywhere in the surface S, and tries to recover 258
the message M by analyzing the observation vector Z E . The 259
wireless channels from Alice to Bob and to Eve are supposed 260
to be statistically independent. 261
B. Channel Model 262
Let us suppose to have two nodes on the surface S, 263
a transmitting node i with position (xi , yi ) and a receiving 264
node j with position (x j , y j ). The channel between node i 265
and node j is modeled as 266
Hi, j = hi, j (τ, ψ) · d−bi, j (1) 267
where di, j is the Euclidian distance between the nodes, b is 268
the path loss exponent and hi, j (τ, ψ) models the multipath 269
fading effect, including angular dispersion 270
hi, j (τ, ψ) =
L∑
l=1
h(l)i, j δ(τ − τl)δ(ψ − ψ j ) (2) 271
The parameter τl is the delay of arrival of the l-th path, while 272
ψl is the angle of arrival of the l-th path, i.e., τ and ψ 273
are modeling the time and angular dispersion of the multiple 274
echoes arriving at the receiver, respectively. The variable 275
h(l)i, j = a(l)i, j e−β
(l)
i, j denotes the channel coefficient, where a(l)i, j 276
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Fig. 2. Antenna pattern of the legitimate transmitter (Alice).








with σa representing the standard deviation of the Rayleigh280
distribution, and β(l)i, j is modeled as a stochastic random281
variable with uniform distribution in (0, 2π). Each link that282
connect two nodes on the surface is supposed to have a fading283
coefficient which is independent to all others.284
C. Received Power285
Let us suppose that the node i is transmitting with power Pi .286
The power received by the node j is287
Pj = Pi |Hi, j |2Gi (θi , φi, j )G j (θ j , φ j,i ) (3)288
where Gi (θi , φi, j ) is the antenna pattern gain of the289
transmitter, φi, j is the angle between the x-axis and the290
segment connecting node i and j , and θi is the angle between291
the x-axis and the direction of maximum radiation (main292
lobe) of i -node’s antenna. Fig. 2 shows the angles mentioned293
above, when node i is the legitimate transmitter, called Alice,294
and node j is the legitimate receiver, called Bob.295
Defining P̃i, j = Pi Gi (θi , φi, j )G j (θ j , φ j,i ) we can296
rewrite (3) as297
Pj = P̃i, j |Hi, j |2 (4)298
Given the position of node i and j on the surface S, the299
angles φi, j and φ j,i are fixed. Then, P̃i, j = P̃i, j (θi , θ j ).300
If, in addition, the receiving node j has isotropic antenna301
θ j = Const ∀ j , then P̃i, j = P̃i, j (θi ).302
According to [18] and [19], the time dispersion of the303
multipath at the receiver has an exponential distribution304
fτ (τ ) = 1
στ
e−(τ−τ0)/στ305








In order to average out the time and angular dispersion,309
the power Pj has to be integrated over all possible times and310
angles of arrival311





|hi, j (τ, ψ)|2 fτ (τ ) fψ(ψ)dτdψ (5)312
D. Aggregate Interference 313
Let us suppose that the NI interfering nodes are distributed 314
on the surface S following a point Poisson process (PPP) 315
distribution with density λ. The sum of the interference power 316




Pk Gk(θk, φk, j )G j (θ j , φ j,k)d
−2b




P̃k, j |Hk, j |2 (6) 319
where Pk is the power emitted by the k-th interfering node, 320
dk, j is the Euclidian distance between the k-th interfering 321
node and node j and hk, j is the channel coefficient associated 322
to the link (1). If the position of the NI interfering nodes 323
(xk, yk) with k = 1, · · · , NI is fixed, then P̃k, j = P̃k, j (θk, θ j ). 324
If, in addition, the receiving node j has isotropic antenna 325
θ j = Const ∀ j , then P̃k, j = P̃k, j (θk). In this case, the 326
aggregate interference I j is a random variable with Stable 327
distribution [16], [17] 328
I j ∼ S(α, 1, γ j ) (7) 329
where α = 1/b and 330













(2 − α) cos(πα/2) if α = 1
2
π
if α = 1
(8) 333
where () denotes the Gamma distribution function and E{} 334
the expectation operator. 335
The PDF of I j is 336
































is the characteristic function of the random variable I . 342
It is important to highlight that depending on the position 343
of the receiver j on the surface S, not all the NI interferers 344
could affect the receiver. The distance (path loss) d−2bk, j could 345
be close to zero, thus the node k does not contribute to the 346
aggregate interference at the receiver j . 347
III. SECRECY PRESSURE AND SECRECY FORCE 348
We want to define a new metric that allows to measure 349
the intensity of secrecy over a given surface. Taking analogy 350
from the atmospheric weather science, we define the concept 351





MUCCHI et al.: NEW METRIC FOR MEASURING THE SECURITY OF AN ENVIRONMENT 5
Fig. 3. Scheme of the transmission of the confidential message M from
Alice to Bob.
Let us now associate the previous defined transmitting353
node i as Alice and the receiving node j as Bob. Alice is354
then located at point (x A, yA) and Bob at (xB, yB) on the355
surface S. The position of the eavesdropper Eve is not known,356
thus we suppose that its coordinates are generically (x, y).357
Suppose that Alice wants to transmit a confidential mes-358
sage M to Bob. Bob tries to recover the information M from359
the vector Z B received (Fig. 3). Given the model in Sec. II,360
the mutual information exchanged in the legitimate link (from361
Alice to Bob) is362
IB = I(M; Z B) = H(M)− H(M|Z B) (10)363
where H() denotes the entropy.364
Analogously, the eavesdropper (Eve) tries to recover the365
message M from the received vector Z E . Thus, the informa-366
tion stolen by Eve is367
IE = I(M; Z E ) = H(M)− H(M|Z E ) (11)368
The term I(M; Z E ) is called Leakage, and it denotes the369
amount of information on the message M that Eve is able370
to recover from the received vector Z E .371
As known, these two mutual information can be used to372
calculate the secrecy capacity [15]373
Csec = max
pM




IE = CB −CE (12)374
where CB and CE are the capacities of Bob’s and Eve’s375
channel, respectively, and pM is the marginal distribution of376
the codeword M . The secrecy capacity is at least as large as377
the difference between the legitimate channel capacity and the378
eavesdroppers channel capacity. The inequality can be strict379
as in the case of complex Gaussian wiretap channels [15],380
as well as typical wireless fading channels, which are here381
considered. It is important to note that both IB and IE depend382
on the channel state and position of Bob and Eve respect to383
Alice, respectively. This means that changing the position of384
Bob or Eve on the surface S, the mutual information changes.385
The capacity of the link between the transmitter, called386
Alice, positioned in (x A, yA), and the position (xB, yB) of387









Fig. 4. Secrecy map of surface S with Alice’s antenna orientation and
pattern. Three interfering nodes (I1, I2, I3) are present. The azimuth of Alice
transmission antenna is 6 deg.
where N0 denotes the Gaussian noise density at the receiver, 390
PB and IB are defined in (4) and (6), respectively. 391
Since typically we cannot know if an eavesdropper, called 392
Eve, is present in the surface S or where it is located, we 393
derive the capacity of a generic point (x, y) of the surface, 394
i.e., 395








where PE and IE are defined as in (4) and (6), respectively 397




Pk Gk(θk, φk,E )GE (θE , φE,k)d
−2b
k,E |hk,E |2 399
Thus, supposing that Eve is located in a generic point (x, y) 400
on the surface S, the secrecy capacity of the link between 401
Alice and Bob is 402
Csec(x, y)=max{0,CB −CE (x, y)}=[CB −CE (x, y)]+ (15) 403
It is important to highlight that the capacities here are intended 404
as conditioned to the state of the channels h A,B , h A,E , hk,B 405
and hk,E , as well as the state of the aggregate interference IB 406
and IE . 407
What we are proposing here is to define a secrecy capacity 408
for each elementary point (x, y) of the surface S. Using this 409
representation, we can elaborate a map of the secrecy of the 410
surface given the position of the known actors, i.e., legitimate 411
users and interfering nodes. In other words, given the positions 412
of Alice, Bob and interfering nodes Ik , for each point (x, y) of 413
the surface, we calculate the secrecy capacity of the legitimate 414
link as Eve was located in that point. The result is that we can 415
draw a map showing the different levels of secrecy of the entire 416
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Csec(x, y)dxdy = Fsec
AS
(16)419
where AS denotes the area of the surface S and the term Fsec420
is denoting what we define as Secrecy Force. The secrecy force421
depends on the locations of the legitimate users and interfering422
nodes, but not on the eavesdroppers. The metric psec is a useful423
parameter that indicates how much is secure a surface S, given424
the position of legitimate nodes and interfering nodes. Using425






sec < · · ·428
The index allows a ranking of a given spatial configuration of429
legitimate entities and interferes.430









0 if CB ≤ CE (x, y)
CB − CE (x, y) if CB > CE (x, y) dxdy433
(17)434
Since CB does not depend on (x, y), if the surface goes to435
infinity, the secrecy pressure tends to a constant value436
lim










This is because the path loss component d−2bA,E (x, y) in (3)439
vanishes as the generic point (x, y) on the surface S goes440
to infinity. In practice, the contributions that decrease the441
secrecy pressure mainly comes from the points on the surface442
close to the legitimate link. In other words, supposing to443
have an infinite surface, the set of points where Eve could be444
located that influence the secrecy capacity is limited, due to445
the path-loss. A point (x, y) too far away from the legitimate446
nodes cannot affect the secrecy capacity, since the legitimate447
signal is received with a too low power to observe anything448
(CE (x, y) = 0).449
From Eq. (15) we can derive another useful representation,450
called Secrecy Map. The Csec(x, y) in (15) is indicating451
which is the secrecy capacity insisting over the elementary452
unit surface dxdy located in a generic point (x, y) of the453
surface S (see Fig. 3). This representation can be used to454
draw the behaviour of the secrecy capacity over the surface S,455
showing zones where the secrecy is low or high, analogously456
to the weather forecast (Fig. 4). The map, in fact, is built by457
calculating the secrecy capacity of the legitimate link as the458
eavesdropper was located in each point of the surface. The blue459
zones in Fig. 4 indicate no secrecy, i.e., if the eavesdropper460
is set there, the secrecy rate of the legitimate link is zero.461
Summarizing, the secrecy map is derived by the following462
steps:463
1) take a surface with cartesian coordinates;464
2) locate the legitimate nodes (Alice and Bob) on the465
surface;466
3) compute the secrecy capacity of the legitimate link 467
assuming that Eve is located in a point (x,y) of the 468
surface; 469
4) associate that secrecy capacity to the corresponding 470
point of the surface; 471
5) repeat 3 and 4 for every point of the surface. 472
The secrecy capacity associated to a generic point of the 473
surface could be zero, i.e., any time Eve has a greater channel 474
capacity compared to Bob. 475
The secrecy map of the surface S changes with 476
• the positions of Alice, Bob and interfering nodes Ik 477
(k = 1, · · · , NI ); 478
• the pattern and the orientation G A(θA) of the legitimate 479
transmitter antenna; 480
• the power of the legitimate transmitter PA; 481
• the power of the transmitters of the interfering nodes Pk ; 482
• the state h A,B , h A,E , hk,B and hk,E of the channels. 483
The effect of time and angle dispersion at the receivers can 484
be averaged out by replacing P j with j = B in (13) and with 485
j = E in (14). 486
As listed in the above items, the secrecy capacity in (15) 487
depends on the instant fading coefficients h A,B , h A,E , hk,B 488
and hk,E . This means that the secrecy pressure (16) (and the 489
secrecy map) depends instantly on these processes. In order 490
to remove the dependance on the instantaneous realizations 491
of the fading coefficients, two solutions can be run: 1) put 492
the characteristic function of the fading coefficients into the 493
secrecy capacity formula and average it out, or more easily, 494
2) assume that the channels are ergodic. The results shown 495
in this paper are calculated by supposing ergodic channels. 496
Ergodic-fading model characterizes a situation in which the 497
duration of a coherence interval is on the order of the time 498
required to send a single symbol. The processes h A,B , h A,E , 499
hk,B and hk,E are mutually independent and i.i.d.; fading coef- 500
ficients change at every channel use and a symbol experiences 501
many fading realizations. 502
The ergodic secrecy capacity is thus [15] 503
C̃sec(x, y) = E|h A,B |2,|h A,E |2,|hk,B |2,|hk,E |2
{[CB − CE (x, y)]+
}
504
k = 1, · · · , NI (19) 505
where the operator E{} stands for the expectation. The ergodic 506
secrecy pressure is obtained by substituting the ergodic secrecy 507





C̃sec(x, y)dxdy (20) 509
Since C̃sec(x, y) could be zero in some points of the surface, 510
computing p̃sec implies to make an integral of an irregular 511
function. 512
It is important to point out that the power received by 513
Eve depends on the position of Eve, since path-loss, fading, 514
angle-of-departure, angle-of-arrival, as well as the power of 515
the aggregate interference are position-dependent parameters. 516
Therefore, in the expression of the capacity of both Bob 517
and Eve, the parameters are position-dependent. Since we 518
want a metric which is not dependent on the position of Eve 519
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Fig. 5. Secrecy pressure when the optimization problem is solved respect to
Alice’s antenna orientation.
we first locate Eve in each point (x,y) of the surface S, we521
calculate the secrecy capacity of each point (x,y) and then we522
integrate over the entire surface S. In this way, we take the523
mean over a space of the secrecy capacity, which eliminates524
the dependence of the secrecy capacity by specific position525
of Eve. The resulting (new) metric is a characteristic of the526
surface and not of the link, thus we called it secrecy pressure.527
IV. SECRECY OPTIMIZATION528
The secrecy pressure can be used as a useful metric to deter-529
mine which is the best configuration parameters to optimize530
the secrecy of a link. The proposed metric is suitable to find531
out different useful results, such as: a) which is the antenna532
orientation that assures highest secrecy towards the legitimate533
receiver; b) where is the best location where to put additional534
interfering node(s) in order to reach higher secrecy for the535
legitimate link; c) which is the best configuration of power536
emissions from the interfering nodes in order to have highest537
secrecy for the legitimate link.538
A. Antenna Orientation539
Let us suppose for simplicity that the interfering nodes Ik540
as well as Bob and Eve have isotropic antennas. Fixed the541
surface S, the positions of the legitimate nodes (Alice, Bob)542
and of the interfering nodes Ik (k = 1, · · · , NI ), and given the543
pattern of the transmitting antenna G A(θA), we can maximize544




Fig. 5 shows the secrecy map over the surface S when547
Eve is supposed to be set somewhere in the surface S and548
the optimization problem is solved respect to Alice’s antenna549
orientation. There exists an optimum azimuth orientation of550
Alice’s antenna. Given the positions of the legitimate users551
and interfering nodes, the best, from the secrecy capacity point552
of view, for Alice is not to point the maximum of the antenna553
pattern towards the direction of Bob. An azimuth orientation of554
+6 deg optimizes the secrecy capacity, in this case. In general,555
with the proposed metric it is possible to derive easily which is556
the best antenna orientation for the transmission to a legitimate557
receiver in a given perimeter, of which we know only the558
Fig. 6. Secrecy map for different positions of Eve (I, II, III and IV quadrant)
when the optimization problem is solved respect to Alice’s antenna orientation.
Fig. 7. Secrecy map over the surface S when the optimization problem is
solved respect to the position of the additional interfering node (flasher).
positions of the interferers (e.g., other access points or base 559
stations). Fig. 6 shows the secrecy map over the surface S 560
for different positions of Eve (I, II, III and IV quadrant) when 561
the optimization problem is solved respect to Alice’s antenna 562
orientation. As an example, suppose that the legitimate users 563
do want to minimize the information leakage in a specific 564
zone of the surface (e.g., the eavesdropper is suspected to be 565
in the third quadrant), then the optimum antenna orientation 566
for Alice is +16 deg (green curve in Fig. 6). 567
B. Interfering Node Positions 568
Fixed the surface S, the positions of the legitimate nodes 569
(Alice, Bob) and given the pattern and orientation of the 570
transmitting antenna G A(θA), we can maximize the secrecy 571
pressure over the position (xk, yk) of the NI +1-th interfering 572
node, a friendly jammer called here flasher, in order to 573
maximize the secrecy pressure of the legitimate link, given 574




Fig. 7 shows the secrecy map over the surface S when the 577
optimization problem (22) is solved. As it can be seen, there 578
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Fig. 8. Optimization of both position and power of the additional interfering
node (flasher).
can be put which optimize the secrecy pressure metric. Like580
forecast weather, the areas with same color bring the same581
secrecy capacity, if the additional interfering node (friendly582
jammer) is installed in that point of the surface. Another583
evident result is that the interfering node cannot be placed584
close to Bob (white hole in Fig. 7), since the this would585
decrease drastically the capacity of the legitimate link and thus586
the secrecy capacity. Fig. 8(a) shows the same secrecy map in587
the case that Eve is supposed to be somewhere in a limited588
perimeter (the green dotted line) inside the surface S. In this589
case the optimum area is modified compared to the previous590
scenario.591
C. Power Allocation of the Interferers592
Fixed the surface S, the positions of the legitimate nodes593
(Alice, Bob) and of the interfering nodes2 Ik , and given the594
pattern and orientation of the transmitting antenna G A(θA),595
2The position of the interfering nodes has been randomly selected by using
a PPP distribution.
we can maximize the secrecy pressure respect to the power 596
emitted by the interfering nodes 597
arg max
Pk
{psec} k = 1, · · · , NI (23) 598
To ease the illustration of this optimization, let us suppose to 599
put an additional interfering node (the 4th) in the scenario and 600
to optimize its transmit power. Figs. 8(a) shows the secrecy 601
map over the surface S when the optimization problem is 602
solved respect to the position of the additional interfering node 603
(flasher) and its power. The eavesdropper is supposed to be 604
located somewhere in a limited perimeter (the green dotted line 605
in the figure) of the surface. The lighter zone of the secrecy 606
map denotes the set of points (x,y) where the flasher can be 607
located to yield the highest secrecy pressure. Fig. 8(b) shows 608
the secrecy pressure as a function of the power of the flasher. 609
The curve evidently shows an optimum point, which in that 610
case is about −9 dB. 611
It is important to stress that using the proposed metric the 612
optimum antenna orientation is not trivially in the direction of 613
the legitimate receiver, as well as the optimum position and 614
power of the intentional jammer (flasher) are not those that 615
the common sense would suggest. 616
D. Joint Optimization 617
Joint optimization of all the parameters (antenna orientation, 618




{psec} k = 1, · · · , NI (24) 621
Graphical results of this optimization are not shown in this 622
paper due to the lack of space. 623
E. Varying the Position of Bob 624
Although the most practical scenario is when Alice and Bob 625
are fixed and Eve can be everywhere in a limited space, as 626
previously described, one could also be interested in using the 627
proposed metric to draw the map of the secrecy pressure when 628
Bob’s position can vary over the surface S. In this case, the 629
steps to draw the map are the following 630
• locate the legitimate receiver (Bob) in a point (x, y) of 631
the surface S; 632
• calculate the secrecy pressure metric (20) for Bob located 633
in that point; 634
• assign to the point (x, y) the value of the secrecy pres- 635
sure; 636
• repeat these points until all the surface S is evaluated. 637
Fig 9(a) shows the map of the secrecy pressure when Bob’s 638
position varies over the surface and Eve’s position varies over 639
the entire surface as well. As expected the secrecy pressure is 640
higher when Bob is inside the main lobe of Alice, while the 641
secrecy pressure decreases drastically when Bob is closer to 642
an interferer. 643
Fig 9(b) shows the map of the secrecy pressure when 644
Bob’s position vary over the surface and Eve’s position 645
varies only in a limited perimeter (the green dashed line). 646
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Fig. 9. Map of the secrecy pressure. The secrecy pressure is calculated as
Bob was in each point (x, y) of the surface S.
the surface S, the zone of maximum secrecy pressure is larger648
and located around the main lobe of Alice. Please note that the649
secrecy pressure behind Alice, e.g. the point (−4,−2), is low650
since there is almost no power from Alice in that direction.651
V. GENERAL DEFINITION OF SECRECY PRESSURE652
AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS653
As stated in the previous sections, the new metric is defined654
starting from the definition of the well-known secrecy capacity655
(Csec). To eliminate the dependence on the position of the656
eavesdropper of the secrecy capacity, we have averaged out657
the secrecy capacity by integrating the Csec over the 2D-space658
of the specific surface S. The resulting metric is called secrecy659
pressure and it is the analytical expression of the average over 660
a space (instead of time). The integral of the Csec function is 661
not easy to derive, since Csec shows sparsely zeros over the 662
2D surface, each time that the capacity of Eve is greater of 663
the capacity of Bob. A closed-form expression of the secrecy 664
pressure is not easy to obtain, even for simple geometry shape 665
like circle or square with generic boundaries. For this reason, 666
we have derived the closed-form expression of the secrecy 667
outage of a surface (see Sec. VI). Although a closed-form 668
expression of the secrecy pressure for a known shape is not 669
shown in the paper, this does not mean that the metric makes 670
no sense. The metric is defined as the spatial average of the 671
secrecy capacity calculated for every point of the surface S. 672
The average of the secrecy capacity over time is called ergodic 673
secrecy capacity in the literature, but no previous paper, in our 674
knowledge, presented the spatial average. 675
This metric shows the secrecy as a characteristic of a 676
surface and not of a single link. This is useful in many 677
practical scenarios, like military tactical scenarios. Typically, 678
military command has a specific perimeter of operation, where 679
the presence of the enemy is not perfectly known, based 680
on the information that the intelligence service or technolo- 681
gies (satellite, etc.) can collect. Most probably, the military 682
command can delimit the presence of the enemy in some 683
zones of the operational scenario, associating the presence 684
of the enemy with a certain probability. By calculating the 685
secrecy pressure, the military command can: 1) quantify how 686
much secure is one perimeter from the point of view of the 687
wireless transmissions; 2) decide the optimum angle for the 688
transmitting antenna array; 3) decide which is the optimum 689
position to place a jammer to enhance the security of the 690
transmission; 4) decide the optimum power of the jammer, 691
in order not to degrade the reception of the legitimate receiver 692
while jamming the potential eavesdropper; 5) operate a multi- 693
parameter optimization; 6) if the position of the eavesdropper 694
is only partially known, the military command can draw 695
zones in the operational perimeter giving to each of them a 696
statistical probability of Eve presence, and then compute the 697
secrecy of the perimeter; 7) if a mobility model of Eve is 698
known or partially (statistically) known, again all the above 699
mentioned parameters (antenna orientation, friendly jammer 700
position, etc.) can be optimized. Other optimizations can be 701
further imagined. 702
As discussed above, in many practical situations we do not 703
know if an eavesdropper is present and where it is located 704
exactly. Thus, we define a probability of presence of Eve to 705
be associated to a generic point (x, y) on the surface S 706






υX,Y (x, y)dxdy (25) 708
where υX,Y (x, y) is the probability density function (PDF) of 709
the presence of Eve in (x, y). From now on we call this PDF 710
υE (x, y). 711
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Fig. 10. Forbidden zone inside the surface S.
where Csec(x, y) = [CB − CE (x, y)]+ and
∫∫
υE (x, y)714
dxdy = 1. Eq. (26) represents the more general expression715
of the secrecy pressure in (16). For example, if a uniform716
distribution of Eve’s presence is supposed for the entire717
surface S, the PDF would be υE (x, y) = 1/AS and thus718 ∫∫
S 1/ASdxdy = 1.719
In the following sections three practical scenarios are pro-720
posed to show the benefits of the new proposed metric.721
In particular, the secrecy pressure is computed when722
• an eavesdropper is known to be in a sub-region of the723
surface S (leakage zone),724
• the eavesdropper position is known with a probability725
spatial function (Gaussian approximation), and726
• when the eavesdropper has not a fixed position (mobility727
scenario).728
In all these cases, some simplifications are assumed729
• the average fading of the channels is supposed to be 1,730
i.e.,
∑
l |h(l)i, j |2 = 1;731
• the antenna pattern of Bob, Eve and of the interfering732
nodes is supposed to be isotropic. Only Alice has a733
directive antenna and can modify the antenna orientation;734
• the position of Alice and Bob on the surface S is supposed735
to be fixed and known: (−4, 0) and (0, 0), respectively;736
• the position of the interfering nodes (I1,I2,I3) is supposed737
to be fixed and known: (−2, 4), (1,−3) and (3, 3),738
respectively.739
A. Leakage Zone740
In many real situations, e.g., in military scenarios, the741
transmitter does not want to leak information in fixed zone,742
in a region where it knows that an eavesdropper is surely743
present. We name here the leakage zone as forbidden zone,744
since the legitimate transmitter surely does not want to leak745
any information in that zone. Fig. 10 shows the surface S with746
the forbidden zone SF inside. In this example the forbidden747
zone is the third quadrant.748
To each point of the surface SF we associate a probability749
of Eve’s presence such that
∫∫
SF
υE (S)dxdy = 1, while in750
the rest of the surface S we set
∫∫
¬SF υE (S)dxdy = 0, where751 ¬SF denotes the complementary surface SF ∪ ¬SF = S.752
Assume, as an example, to have an equal distribution753
of the probability of Eve’s presence in the surface SF .754
Fig. 11. Gaussian distribution of Eve’s presence inside the surface S.
Than, 755






, if x ∈ [0, xE ] and y ∈ [0, yE ]
0, otherwise
(27) 756






υE (x, y)Csec(x, y)dxdy (28) 758
The secrecy map f the surface can be drawn by using the 759
following result 760











0 CE (x, y)dxdy otherwise
762
(29) 763
The optimization of the secrecy pressure respect to the 764
azimuth of the transmitting antenna of the legitimate node 765
(Alice) for a forbidden zone is shown in Fig. 5. 766
B. Gaussian Probability of Eavesdropper Presence 767
In other situations, it is not known exactly if eavesdroppers 768
are present or not. Only suspicious. In this case, located a 769
point on the map, a probability of presence of Eve with 770
certain distribution can be associated. We suppose here that 771
a Gaussian spatial distribution of Eve’s presence is associated 772
to a zone of the surface S. To each point of the surface 773
S we associate a probability of Eve’s presence υE which 774
is a random variable with Gaussian distribution centered in 775
(xE , yE ) (Fig. 11). The circle lines denotes the intensity of 776
the probability. For example, if the Gaussian random variable 777
denoting the presence of Eve on the surface has mean 0.8 and 778
variance 1, we associate a probability of Eve’s presence equal 779
to 0.8 to the point (xE , yE ). 780




υE (x, y)Csec(x, y)dxdy (30) 782




2σE , where σE indicates the 783
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The secrecy map of the surface can be drawn by using the785
following result786
υE (x, y)Csec(x, y)dxdy787
=
{
0 if Csec(x, y) ≤ 0
CB −
∫∫
S υE (x, y)CE (x, y)dxdy otherwise
788
(31)789
This scenario is a particular case of the mobility scenario790
described in the next section, the results can be appreciated791
in Fig. 13(b).792
C. Mobility Model for the Eavesdropper793
If we know the position of Eve at time tn , we can associate794
to the eavesdropper a statistical mobility model and derive the795
secrecy pressure over a surface of interest. The mobility model796
for Eve depends on its movement capability in the specific797
environment. In the absence of prior information on the real798
movement of the eavesdropper (i.e., Eve is free to move in all799
directions with different speeds), the Gaussian mobility model800
represents a fairly general model with a tractable number of801
parameters. In the presence of some prior information on the802
eavesdroppers movement (e.g., direction or speed is set by the803
environment), a mobility model more tight to the real mobility804
would provide better performance.805
Optimization of the secrecy pressure is shown respect to806
the azimuth of the legitimate transmitting antenna as well as807
respect to the position of the flasher.808
We consider here Gaussian mobility model with conditional809
PDF of current position conditioned on the previous position.810
For easier notation, let us define the position (x, y) at time tn811
of a point on the surface S as a vector pn . Thus, the conditional812
PDF of current position is813
υm(pn|pn−1) = 1





(pn−µn )T−1m (pn−µn )
]
(32)814
where µn varies with the mobility model as described in815
the following, and the covariance matrix m accounts for816








where σm,x and σm,y is the standard deviation along the x and820
y axes, respectively. The parameter ρ takes into account the821
possible inter-dependence of the two coordinates. Independent822
coordinates have ρ = 0.823
The mean µn depends on the position pn−1 and the speed824
vn−1 according to825
µn = pn−1 + vn−1(tn − tn−1) (34)826
where vn−1 is the vector of the speed along x and y axes at827
time tn−1.828
Fig. 12 shows the secrecy map over the surface S as a829
function of the position of the flasher (22) and with mobility830
model for the eavesdropper (32). Eve is suspected to move831
vertically from its previous position, with a mobility model832
given by (32). The interfering nodes I1, I2 and I3 are fixed.833
Fig. 12. Secrecy map of the position of the flasher with mobility model for
the eavesdropper.
Solving (22) gives the optimum point where to locate the 834
additional flasher I4. Best is to put the flasher close to the 835
point where the eavesdropper is supposed to arrive. This is 836
somehow trivial. 837
In order to complicate the scenario we supposed that Eve is 838
moving from (3,−3) to (3, 3) with a mobility model given 839
by (32) (see Fig. 13(a)) in six time steps. Alice antenna 840
azimuth orientation can vary from −30 to +30 deg. The 841
resulting map of the secrecy pressure is shown in Fig. 13(b). 842
The map shows which is the optimum transmit antenna 843
orientation (azimuth) at each time step. As an example, at 844
time step 6, Eve is stochastically supposed to be in (3, 3) 845
and thus an orientation between −18 to +8 deg optimizes 846
the secrecy capacity for the Eve’s mobility scenario. In this 847
case the secrecy rate achievable is more than 3.20 bps. On the 848
contrary, at time step 3 the maximum secrecy rate achievable is 849
1.28 bps with an antenna orientation range of (−26,−20) deg. 850
VI. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY 851
OF A SURFACE (SOPS) 852
A closed-form of the secrecy pressure is not easy to be 853
derived. Another interesting metric could be the outage prob- 854
ability of the secrecy capacity over a surface. A secure outage 855
occurs when the instantaneous secrecy capacity Csec(x, y) is 856
less than target secrecy rate Rsec. Thus, the secure outage 857
probability is defined as 858
Pout (Rsec)(x, y) = Prob{Csec(x, y) < Rsec} (35) 859
Note that the outage probability depends on the location (x, y) 860
of the eavesdropper over the surface. Given the result above, 861
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Fig. 13. Eve’s mobility: scenario description and secrecy map over azimuth
of Alice’s antenna.
The secrecy outage probability of a surface depends on866
the probability υE (x, y) that Eve is located in the point a867
generic point (x, y) of the surface. An interesting behaviour868
to study is the existence of the secrecy capacity over a869
surface, i.e., when Rsec is set to zero. In this case the SOPS870
becomes871
Aout(Rsec = 0) =
∫∫
S
Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0}υE (x, y)dxdy872
(37)873
The term υE (x, y) is the distribution of the presence of Eve874
over the surface, which could be uniform or Gaussian or875
any other distribution, based on what it is known about the876
eavesdroppers. The term Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0} can be derived877
as878
Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0}=Prob{SN RE (x, y)≥ SN RB } (38)879
where 880
SN RB = PB
N0 + IB (39) 881
SN RE (x, y) = PE
N0 + IE (40) 882
with PB , PE defined as in (3) and IB , IE as in (6). 883
Eq. (38) is hard to be calculated analytically, since the term 884
at numerator PB is Rayleigh distributed, while the term at 885
the denominator IB is Stable distributed. A closed form can 886
be reached if we assume that the Gaussian approximation is 887
valid for the aggregate interference, i.e., IB ∼ N (0, NB ) and 888
IE ∼ N (0, NE ). In this case Eq. (41) becomes 889
SN RB = PB
N0 + NB (41) 890
SN RE (x, y) = PE
N0 + NE (42) 891
and Eq. (38) can be written as [20] 892
Prob{Csec(x, y) = 0} = Prob{SN RE (x, y) ≥ SN RB } 893
= SN R E (x, y)






A,i E{|h A,i |2}
N0 + Ni 896
with i = {B, E} and E{} is the expectation operator. 897






SN R E (x, y)
SN R B + SN R E (x, y)
υE (x, y)dxdy 899
(44) 900
In the case of a target secrecy rate greater than zero Rsec > 0, 901













SN R B · exp
{
− 2Rsec−1
S N R B
}
SN R B + 2Rsec SN R E (x, y)
⎞
⎟⎠υE (x, y)dxdy 905
(45) 906
The results of the SOPS are shown in Fig. 14. The curves are 907
derived by supposing a Gaussian distribution of the presence 908
of Eve on the surface, i.e., 909





The other parameters are set as follows: E{|h A,i |2} = 1 with 911
i = {B, E}, σE ranges from 0.2 to 5. 912
Fig. 14 shows the SOPS (Aout(Rsec = 0)) as a function of 913
the standard deviation σE of the distribution of Eve’s presence 914
on the surface S. Eve is located in three different positions: at 915
Alice’s, at Bob’s and at the first interferer’s I1. The positions 916
of Alice, Bob and the interferers I1, I2 and I3 are shown 917
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Fig. 14. Secrecy outage of the surface S as a function of the standard
deviation σE of the distribution of Eve’s presence over S. Eve’s distribution
is Gaussian and centered in three different positions: at Alice’s, at Bob’s and
at the first interferer’s I1.
Fig. 15. Secrecy pressure outage map of the surface S.
The orange dotted line in Fig. 14 reports the results when919
Eve’s distribution is centered on the same position of Alice.920
The curve of the SOPS confirms that a higher dispersion of the921
probability of Eve’s presence yields a lower surface secrecy922
outage. This is logic, since a higher variance of the Gaussian923
distribution means higher probability that Eve is located far924
away from Alice. The green dashed line in Fig. 14 reports925
the results when Eve’s distribution is centered on the same926
position of the first interferer I1. The curve of the SOPS, in927
this case, are completely different from the previous one, as928
expected. The SOPS increases with the variance σE , since929
a higher dispersion of the position of Eve means a higher930
probability that Eve is located far away from the interference931
source, which jams Eve’s receiver.932
The blue solid line in Fig. 14 reports the results when933
Eve’s distribution is centered on Bob’s position. The SOPS934
increases with the variance σE , since a higher dispersion of935
the position of Eve means a higher probability that Eve is936
located closer to the source of the information (Alice), i.e.,937
Eve’s could have a better signal to noise ratio compared938
to Bob.939
The secrecy pressure outage map of the entire surface is 940
shown in Fig. 15. 941
VII. CONCLUSIONS 942
This paper proposes and studies a new metric for measuring 943
the secrecy potentials of a surface. This metric is defined 944
secrecy pressure. Using the metric different environments or 945
surfaces can be ordered as a function of the secrecy rate 946
that can be assured. The metric can be used also for solving 947
optimization problems, e.g., finding which is the best transmit 948
antenna orientation to maximize the secrecy capacity of the 949
surface, or finding which is the best position of an addi- 950
tional interfering node (friendly jammer). Different practical 951
scenarios are investigated, including mobility option for the 952
eavesdropper. Another metric, the secrecy outage probability 953
of a surface (SOPS), is derived. In this case the presence of 954
Eve is supposed to be uncertain, and modelled as a Gaussian 955
distribution over the surface. The results of the SOPS are 956
shown as a function of the dispersion of Eve’s position. The 957
Gaussian distribution is centered in three specific points: at 958
Alice’s, at Bob’s and at the first interferer’s. 959
In addition the first part of the paper includes a general 960
framework to evaluate the secrecy capacity over a surface. The 961
framework includes all the parameters affecting the secrecy 962
capacity, from nodes spatial distribution, to antenna orientation 963
and pattern, and propagation medium statistics. 964
This paper offers a new perspective on the role of secrecy 965
over a surface, considering nodes spatial distribution, wireless 966
propagation medium, and aggregate network interference. 967
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